

Evaluation of public procurement directives

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

Introduction

This public consultation forms an integral part of the **evaluation of the EU public procurement directives**:

- Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts
- Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement
- Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors).

The **objectives of the directives** have been to ensure an efficient use of public funds, contribute to the high level of competition in the single market, and promote transparency and integrity of public spending. The directives were also expected to contribute to making Europe a more green, social and innovative economy, increase SMEs' participation in procurement procedures, reduce the administrative burden related to procurement procedures, simplify them and make more flexible.

The purpose of this evaluation is to collect information that allows the Commission to assess the EU procurement markets and understand:

- the effectiveness and coherence of the EU legal framework for public procurement
- whether this legal framework is still adequate in the current context.

The directives have been **transposed into national law**. Feedback on national legislation that does not transpose the directives is outside of this consultation's scope.

The results of this public consultation will be summarised in a factual report, which will be published on the Have Your Say website. The results will also be analysed together with other data and presented in the Commission's report on the evaluation of the public procurement directives and an accompanying staff working document.

This consultation is composed of five themes. You will be able to provide additional **free text comments** concerning each of them. At the end of the survey you can upload a file with a more detailed contribution, including any **evidence** you may have.

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- ☒ Business association
- ☐ Company/business
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- ☐ EU citizen
- ☐ Environmental organisation
- ☐ Non-EU citizen
- ☐ Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
- ☐ Public authority

- ☐ Trade union
- ☐ Other

* First name

Jan

* Surname

REMPALA

* Email (this won't be published)

j.rempala@businessseurope.eu

* Organisation name

255 character(s) maximum

BusinessEurope

* Organisation size

- ☐ Micro (1 to 9 employees)
- ☒ Small (10 to 49 employees)
- ☐ Medium (50 to 249 employees)
- ☐ Large (250 or more)

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Tristan da Cunha | ☐ Zambia |
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Experience with EU public procurement

Section 1: Simpler, more flexible rules, value for money, transparency, integrity

Have the directives reached their objectives?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives helped contracting authorities* get better value for money when procuring works, goods and services.	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives made the scope of the applicable rules clearer .	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives provided sufficient flexibility in the public procurement system (e.g. a broader choice of procedures and procurement techniques).	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) helped lower the administrative burden when procuring works, goods and services.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) made it faster to procure works, goods and services.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives set out simpler rules for the EU public procurement system.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives helped reduce corruption and fend off political pressure in public procurement procedures.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives fostered a culture of integrity and fair play in public procurement.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives increased the professionalisation of public buyers.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives increased transparency by setting the proper framework for the publication of tenders at all stages of the public procurement procedure.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives gave greater legal certainty on the compliance with procurement procedures.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives facilitated prompt payments to subcontractors for the works, goods and services offered.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

* Throughout this survey the term "contracting authorities" is understood as contracting authorities and entities.

The directives' objectives were to be achieved through rules set out in these legal acts.

In this context, do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
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The directives' rules aiming at procedural simplification (e.g. eProcurement, European single procurement document 'ESPD', the use of self-declarations) are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules aiming to increase procedural flexibility (e.g. the choice of available procedures, time limits for submitting offers, contract modifications) are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on transparency (e.g. EU-wide publication via Tenders Electronic Daily 'TED') are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on monitoring (e.g. the quality of data provided in TED) are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on integrity (e.g. exclusion grounds, conflict of interest rules) are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

If you have comments concerning any of the statements above, please provide them here.

We believe that overall value for money has been achieved in EU procurement. European-wide rules are essential, and historically, businesses have benefited from the directives. However, a decline in bids indicates that contracting authorities are receiving fewer offers. Although the directives improve upon the 2004 framework, the Court of Auditors has noted a lack of awareness regarding the role of competition in achieving value for money. Both the Commission and member states have not fully leveraged available data to identify the root causes of limited competition, taking only scattered steps to reduce obstacles. (ECA report, p47)

Flexibility and simplification are other areas where the directives are meant to help, yet their benefits are offset by rising administrative times. In 2011, around 60% of firms noted that participation in EU-regulated procurement was becoming more costly and time-consuming—an issue particularly felt by SMEs. The ECA report shows that the decision-making period increased from 62.5 days in 2011 to 96.4 days in 2021. Data from the Single Market Scoreboard (2019–2022) confirms similar trends, with average decision speeds of approximately 100 days each year. The 2011 Impact Assessment had recorded an overall contract time of 58 days, illustrating a significant deterioration in efficiency.

Regarding corruption, integrity, and transparency, the directives have theoretically aided progress, though more data is needed. The 2014 EU Anti-Corruption report indicates that corrupt practices can add 20–50% to the total cost of a contract. In 2010, the direct cost of corruption in five sectors across eight member states ranged from 1.4 to 2.2 billion EUR. Efforts by the Commission through initiatives such as SEGPP, the 2017 /572 Communication, and the 2021 guidelines on fighting collusion have been important steps toward addressing these issues.

In terms of transparency, initial improvements were observed; for example, publication numbers doubled between 1995 and 2002. However, during that period only 16% of estimated public procurement was published, with significant variation across Member States and regions. More recently, over half of the EU-27 experienced unsatisfactory publication rates below 5% between 2011 and 2021, and 43% did not monitor this key indicator. Additionally, the Single Market Scoreboard reveals an alarming increase in missing supplier and buyer registration numbers.

We are also concerned that while single bidding has risen, there is no monitoring of in-house procurement practices.

Concerning legal certainty, the directives have provided theoretical clarity, yet their implementation remains problematic. Many contracting authorities still fear litigation from procedural errors, limiting their willingness to move beyond price as the primary criterion and impeding the application of MEAT. The question of legal certainty for public buyers on how to buy quality should therefore be addressed.

The lack of robust data further complicates the evaluation process, with the ECA report suggesting that the Single Market Scoreboard could benefit from improved methodologies and new indicators.

Finally, on the issue of integrity and exclusion grounds, interpretations vary, sometimes resulting in disproportionate exclusions based on minor infringements. The vague, general formulation of the directives allows for divergent interpretations by national authorities, leading to exclusions not strictly based on procurement procedures. With around 40 sectoral rules affecting public procurement, many are broadly incompatible with the exclusion provisions of Article 57 under Directive 2014/24.

Regarding procedural simplification through the ESPD, while the idea is sound, its implementation has faltered due to technical shortcomings in digitalisation. The industry had insufficient time to comment on the national standards for e-procurement, undermining the intended benefits of the ESPD.

Section 2: Easier market access, SMEs and cross-border participation

Have the directives reached their objectives?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives resulted in more competition in public procurement markets (e.g. rules on transparency make it easier for companies to enter markets).	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
The directives set out rules that ensure the equal treatment of bidders from other EU countries in all stages of the process and the objective evaluation of tenders.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
The directives made it easier for SMEs to bid for public contracts (e.g. the possibility to divide tenders into lots).	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives made it easier to bid on public contracts from abroad (e.g. through eProcurement).	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

The directives' objectives were to be achieved through rules set out in these legal acts.

In this context, do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives' rules on SMEs' market access are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on eProcurement are still relevant and adequate as a tool to facilitate market access .	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

The directives' rules on market access of companies from other EU countries are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on market access of companies from non-EU countries are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives' rules on public-public cooperation and in-house procurement are still relevant and adequate.	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐

If you have comments concerning any of the statements above, please provide them here.

We have concerns regarding the phrasing of some questions. Terms like “relevant” and “adequate” might lead to different conclusions; while all issues may be relevant, their adequacy is debatable.

Regarding whether the Directives have led to more competition, our response must be nuanced. Although the Directives have generally helped open up markets, more data and studies are needed to link the 2014 reforms to the observed decline in competition. Numerous worrying indicators—such as prolonged administrative procedures, increased instances of single bidding, and more frequent lot divisions—suggest that competition in public procurement is diminishing. We believe these issues largely stem from poor implementation coordination, as the ECA report noted that member states have focused more on compliance than performance.

On the matter of equal treatment for EEA/EU bidders, while the Directives are intended to support this, cross-border procurement remains very low. The ECA report indicates that direct cross-border procurement is around 5%, whereas indirect cross-border procurement is considerably higher. Factors affecting this include the type of procurement procedure (open vs. negotiated), the specific legislative framework (with sectors like utilities and defence showing higher cross-border participation), and geographical nuances. Economic and cultural linkages, language, and proximity further influence cross-border trends, with large firms dominating such procurement—accounting for roughly 69.5% of the value in direct cross-border deals and up to 79.5% in indirect ones.

SME participation can be argued as acceptable on paper. While data from 2011 to 2017 shows that approximately 61% of above-threshold contracts were awarded to SMEs, these only represent 33% of the total contract value. The larger the contract value, the lower the likelihood that an SME will win the bid. Although recent figures, such as those from the 2022 Single Market Scoreboard, indicate that many Member States exceed the 60% threshold for SME bids, these metrics can be misleading. SMEs tend to concentrate in lower-value contracts and are therefore more susceptible to changes in threshold amounts. For instance, the 2011 Impact Assessment warns that doubling the threshold could eliminate 20,000 contracts—a significant loss for SMEs. Moreover, the cost of tendering is relatively higher for SMEs, and although the possibility of forming consortia exists under the Directives, competition rules may discourage such collaboration due to fears of breaching competition law.

For market access from non-EU bidders, the Directives face challenges, particularly in light of evolving case law like Case C-652/22 “Kolin,” which overrides the 2019 guidelines. The introduction of new tools concerning FSR, FSI, IPI, and the existing provisions on abnormally low tenders must be used coherently to assess their effectiveness.

Finally, on the issue of in-house/public-public cooperation, the Commission should take a closer look at in-house procurement practices, which pose a serious threat to competition. For example, in Spain, the number of in-house contracts has increased by 77% annually, with a 350% rise in the volume of investment; additionally, in nearly 75% of cases, the economic justification for these contracts has not been published. Similar concerns arise in Finland, where in-house procurement is estimated at around 7 billion EUR, often involving municipal companies with highly fragmented ownership. These practices continue to face legal challenges from our Members.

Strategic public procurement

Section 3: Addressing strategic challenges

Have the directives reached their objectives?

Impact on contracting authorities

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives encouraged contracting authorities to buy environmentally friendly works, goods and services.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives encouraged contracting authorities to buy socially responsible works, goods and services.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives encouraged contracting authorities to buy innovative works, goods and services.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

Impact on suppliers

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives encouraged companies to make greater efforts in meeting environmental standards in their economic activities.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives encouraged companies to consider social aspects more in their economic activities.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The directives encouraged companies to make wider use of innovative solutions in their economic activities.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

The directives' objectives were to be achieved through rules set out in these legal acts.

In this context, do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
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The directives' rules that aim for environmentally friendly procurement (e.g. quality assurance standards and environmental management standards) are still relevant and adequate.						
The directives' rules that aim for socially responsible procurement (e.g. reserved contracts, requirements on accessibility for people with disabilities and design for all users) are still relevant and adequate.						
The directives' rules on supporting innovation (e.g. innovation partnership, competitive dialogue) are still relevant and adequate.						
The directives' rules on supporting all types of strategic procurement (e.g. the use of the most economically advantageous tender) are still relevant and adequate.						
The directives' rules on the transfer of intellectual property rights to enable public procurement to drive innovation are still relevant and adequate.						

If you have comments concerning any of the statements above, please provide them here.

In short the link between CAEs, suppliers, and criteria is that despite the Directive outlining these criteria as permissible and encouraging, the uptake has failed. This leads us to conclude their implementation falls short.

However the EU must be cautious against moving to a framework that dictates Contracting Authorities 'what to buy.' The implementation of any strategic criteria must always be linked to the subject matter. A blanket imposition of quotas/criteria without the regard to the circumstances and resources of buyers can lead to sub-optimal procurement practices such as limited competition or corruption.

In the survey data collected for the 2011 IA, it found that 37.9% of the participating contracting authorities experienced an increase in cost when stipulating for environmental requirements, while 33.2% reported costs stayed constant and only 1.7% saw no increase in cost. This can suggest strategic procurement entails a higher cost, which as addressed under the SME access portion, can particularly disadvantage SMEs from participating. What can assist in shouldering the burden of costs related to strategic procurement is the usage of a price adjustment mechanism to cover changes in energy, material or labour costs for example.

This hesitation by authorities to utilise strategic procurement and deviate from the traditional price only method can be explained as well by the fact the poor implementation of the directives translates into a fear of authorities making errors in the process and triggering legal action. In the 2011 IA survey data showed that 25% of responding contracting authorities incurred a form of litigation cost above threshold. On average this 25% reported 8 person-days of cost dedicated to handling litigation complaints. Implying an average for all gov. authorities in EU of 2.6 in-person days per transaction or about 350.000 person days annually across Europe for managing litigation/complaints. One way to solve this is to continue focusing on the need to increase professionalisation of buyers and the tenders. Earmarking procurement damages imposed on a contracting authority for special education/skills fund could be an example of how to fund and sustain these programs.

For more on the specifics of strategic criteria we refer to our supplementary paper chapter on the subject.

Competition in the EU public procurement market

Section 4: Competition

	Too high	Adequate	Too low	No opinion
The level of competition in the EU public procurement market is ...	☐	☐	☒	☐
The frequency of single bidding (awarding a contract after only receiving one offer) is ...	☒	☐	☐	☐
The frequency of direct awards (negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice) is	☒	☐	☐	☐

The frequency of awards based on price only (as different from the most economically advantageous awards) is ...	☒	☐	☐	☐
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Do you agree with either of these statements about the **high frequency of single bidding**?

- ☐ It is a sign of bad procurement practices.
- ☐ It is not linked to procurement practices, but due to market structure or other factors unrelated to procurement.
- ☒ I don't agree with either of the statements above

Do you agree with either of these statements about the **high frequency of direct awards**?

- ☐ It is a sign of bad procurement practices.
- ☐ It is a legitimate procurement practice under certain circumstances and may facilitate the flexibility and timeliness of procedures.
- ☒ I don't agree with either of the statements above.

Do you agree with either of these statements about the **high frequency of price only awards**?

- ☐ It is a sign of bad procurement practices.
- ☐ It may be more efficient in certain circumstances (e.g. a simpler and faster way to buy homogenous goods).
- ☐ High quality can be assured through technical requirements.
- ☒ I don't agree with either of the statements above.

Over the last 8 years, the level of competition in the EU public procurement market has...

- ☐ increased
- ☐ remained the same
- ☒ decreased
- ☐ No opinion.

Feel free to comment on issues that you may have experienced with the level of competition in EU public procurement market.

We believe the phrasing of these questions is poorly done and is too simplistic.

It is startling to see the change in competition, the PwC study from 2011 found that competition was considerable at the time, with an average of 5.4 offers per tender, and local government markets being more

competitive than at central level. Unfortunately as we explain below this optimistic outlook has changed.

A high frequency of Single Bidding can be seen as a bad procurement practices but may be a mix of market factors and bad practices. It is too simplistic to declare the practice as A. or B. The fact is, as the ECA report shows from 2011-2021 single bidding increased from 23.5% to 41.8%. While the number of bidders has dropped from an average of 5.7 to 3.2 bidders per procedure.

Yet single bidding is legally permitted so long as the principles of transparency and non-discrimination are respected. Rather the contracting authority could face potential exposure to liability if they decide to cancel the tendering procedure on the basis of only a single bid as established by the ECJ under C-92/00 'Hospital Ingenuire' (para 55) There are numerous 'single bidding' practices that exist in the procurement framework such as the usage of the Innovation Partnership or the granting of special and exclusive rights in the utilities directive which further complicate the matter. In the course of the evaluation it must be investigated to what extent a revision of the 2014 Directives should specifically state actions regarding single bidding, or if this is a matter for implementation. Such ideas could be to replace the lowest-price criterion with a lowest cost of total ownership or second lowest price auction.

As the ECA report shows, the frequency of direct awards varies greatly across Member States from as low as 3.1% to 42.3%. In theory the practice can be legitimate but it should not be a norm or usual practice for contracting authorities to seek this option. It is therefore a mix of bad and legitimate procurement practice depending on the circumstance and market conditions of the sector in question. The ECA report illustrates that from 2011-2021 direct awards in Financial Services dropped from 18% to 8% whereas in energy they rose from 16% to 29%, we agree with the ECA conclusion that contracting authorities seem to react to the competition conditions of the sector. Overall the rate of direct awards is too high.

Regarding the High Frequency of price only awards, It is problematic to see high price-only awards but in many instances it remains the most legally sound criteria that can be used without other bidders wanting to challenge the award in court. It is undeniable that price-only has risen, the indicator flagged by the ECA is that the EU average number of bidders has dropped from 5.7 in 2011, to 3.2 in 2021 while Single Bidding increased from 23.5 in 2011 to 41.8 in 2021.

The ECA's findings can be reinforced from the data collected by PwC in 2011. PwC found in that 1 in 5 tenders received one bid (so 25%- in line with ECA) While in 2011 most tenders received 4-6 offers. Procedure-wise this also made a difference as Open and Restricted were around 6 offers per tender, indicating these may be more conducive to competition than negotiated procedures.

However, while Open procedure may be more conducive to competition, it would appear it could also lead to a preference for price-only. The 2011 PwC study showcased that 70% of tenders at the time used a combined EMAT criteria, while 30% were lowest price only. Price was mainly used in less complex procedures like negotiated without publication or accelerated. The more complex procedures such as restricted and negotiated used price less. While the competitive dialogue hardly used price. However in open procedure, 65% utilised price.

All this indicates is that the correlation and relationships between procedures needs to be closely evaluated and more comparative data is needed before any assertions on the solution to the problems in competition can be made. For example a way to avoid price only could be to encourage CAEs to factor lowest TCO instead of price. We also note the verdict from the ECJ in Case C-424/23, which outlines the functional requirements for competition and the 'equivalence clause.'

On competition in general, from the data collected by our Swedish Federation SN, in Sweden, it emerged that in 65.2 percent of cases the winners were recurring or partially recurring winners. We strongly suggest

the European Commission conduct a similar survey to complement and deepen the results of this finding. In our view 65% is too high and stifles competition.

Coherence and resilience of the EU public procurement framework

Section 5: Coherence

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The three public procurement directives* are coherent with each other.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
The objectives of the three public procurement directives are coherent with each other.	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
EU public procurement legislation on defence and security procurement is coherent with the three public procurement directives.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
EU public procurement legislation on remedies is coherent with the three public procurement directives.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
EU legislation relating to public procurement (e.g. sectorial rules such as the Net-Zero Industry Act or Clean Vehicles Directive) is coherent with the three public procurement directives.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
The directives led to a more consistent application of public procurement policy across EU countries .	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

* Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts, Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors.

If you have comments concerning any of the statements above, please provide them here.

The wide range of sectoral legislation dealing touching upon public procurement must be thoroughly analysed. At the moment we do not know how coherent these pieces of legislations are.

Section 6: Resilience

Are the directives still relevant and adequate given the changing circumstances?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The directives are fit for purpose to contribute to the EU's strategic autonomy * (including the security of EU supply chains).	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives are fit for purpose in urgent situations , allowing contracting authorities to procure works, goods and services in a timely manner and even make purchases more quickly when necessary.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives are fit for purpose if there are major supply shortages (e.g. supply-chain disruptions during a health, energy or security crisis).	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
The directives are fit for purpose to ensure that security considerations are properly addressed by the contracting authorities.	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

* EU strategic autonomy refers to the capacity of the EU to act autonomously. That means not being dependent on other countries in strategically important policy areas.

If you have comments concerning any of the statements above, please provide them here.

The directives set the groundwork for achieving strategic autonomy yet the idea of introducing 'Buy European' criteria must be carefully weighed and certainly any blanket justification for 'buy local' must be avoided.

However we do acknowledge that some sectors may benefit from this approach and a limited preference for European may be required given the geopolitical situation. The fact that the Directives allow for a sectoral approach as evident by the Net Zero Act is an important indicator of their suitability in theory to meeting the current challenges around dependencies. The methodology the NZIA introduces could be applied to other sectors. However sectoral legislation must always respect the main procurement framework and the EU's obligations to the GPA.

Yet considering the importance of the NZIA as a template for resiliency criteria we wonder if this section is premature as the NZIA has yet to fully be implemented (importantly the minimum requirements for sustainability) and much of the correlative data required to assess the effectiveness of the NZIA's criteria has yet to be collected.

Comparisons

Section 7: Below EU thresholds procurement

When compared with procurement **below EU thresholds***, carrying out transactions under the directives' rules is ...

	Always	Very often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know
simpler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
better value for money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
faster	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more transparent and fair	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more professional	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
subject to more competition	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more environmentally friendly	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more socially responsible	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more supportive for innovation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
better in preventing corruption	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

* Thresholds are as follows (approximately): (i) works or concession contracts worth more than €5.5 million; (ii) supply or service contracts with public authorities worth more than €140 000; and (iii) supply or service contracts in the water, energy or transport sectors worth more than €440 000.

Section 8: Private procurement

When compared with **private procurement**, selling under the directives' rules is

...

	Always	Very often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	I don't know
simpler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
better value for money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
faster	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more transparent and fair	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more professional	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
subject to more competition	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more environmentally friendly	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more socially responsible	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
more supportive for innovation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
better in preventing corruption	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Thank you for your contribution. Please feel free to provide further comments or attach a file summarising your position on the directives' evaluation.

Attached is our supplementary document which elaborates on our general position further.

Please upload your file(s)

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

Contact

GROW-C2@ec.europa.eu

